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COMMERCIAL LAW-The New Mexico Supreme Court
Answers a Moot Question of Partnership Law:
First National Bank in Albuquerque v. Sanchez
I.

INTRODUCTION

First National Bank in Albuquerque v. Sanchez' presents a unique fact
situation in which two partners attempted to bring separate claims, each
on behalf of a general partnership. Subsequently, one partner purported
to release the partnership's claim. The New Mexico Supreme Court held
that the first partner could neither bring nor release a partnership claim
because the complaint, answer, and subsequent release did not mention
the partnership by name. 2 The court further held that the second partner
could, however, bring a claim on behalf of the partnership because the
partner and the adverse party, by their conduct at trial, treated most of
the claims for damages as partnership damages. 3 The court upheld the
validity of the partnership claim even though the second partner's claim
also failed to mention the partnership. 4 The court issued the Sanchez
opinion even though the parties had settled all matters before the final
opinion was filed.'
This Note will examine the mootness doctrine, address the shortcomings
of the court's analysis of the partnership issues, and suggest an alternative
approach for analyzing the validity of partnership claims brought and
released by fewer than all partners of a general partnership.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pat and Susan Sanchez ("Sanchez") and Anthony Tafoya were equal
partners in P-S Construction Company. 6 The partnership obtained a
construction loan in the amount of $400,000 from First National Bank
in Albuquerque ("FNB"). Sanchez and Tafoya planned to use the money
to develop sixty-one undeveloped residential lots owned by the partnership.
The sixty-one undeveloped lots were mortgaged to FNB to secure the
note.
FNB disbursed $274,757 of the proceeds under the note; however, when
the partners requested the remaining $125,243 needed to complete the
development, FNB demanded additional financial information. The bank
began to treat the loan as if it were an acquisition and development

1. 112 N.M. 317, 815 P.2d 613 (1991). Justice Ransom wrote for the court and Chief Justice
Sosa and Justice Montgomery concurred. Id.
2. Id. at 326, 815 P.2d at 622.
3. Id. at 325, 815 P.2d at 621.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 326, 815 P.2d at 622.
6. Id. at 318, 815 P.2d at 614. Pat and Susan Sanchez held a 500 interest and Tafoya held
the remaining 500 interest in P-S Construction Co. Id. at 319, 815 P.2d at 615.
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loan instead of a construction loan secured by a standard residential real
estate mortgage covering the sixty-one undeveloped lots. An acquisition
and development loan requires extensive financial and project documentation, disbursement of funds in stages as completion of the project
progresses, and various other requirements. 7 The original loan agreement
did not contain any of8 the conditions or requirements of an acquisition
and development loan.
The partners did not comply with FNB's demands for additional information. FNB consequently refused to disburse the remaining $125,243
as required by the loan agreement. The partners sought financing elsewhere
but were unsuccessful. Sanchez and Tafoya thus could not complete the
project and they defaulted on the note, causing FNB to foreclose on the
secured lots. The partnership subsequently failed. 9
FNB instituted a collection action on the promissory note against the
partnership to collect the $274,757 disbursed to the partnership and a
foreclosure action on the mortgaged lots. The partners stipulated to a
judgment in FNB's favor for the balance due on the note plus interest,
and foreclosure on the undeveloped lots securing the debt. In exchange,
FNB waived any deficiency judgment and agreed that the stipulation
would not prejudice the right of the partners to pursue counterclaims
against the bank.
Both Tafoya and Sanchez counterclaimed. Tafoya, however, dismissed
his counterclaim. Tafoya's release provided that the dismissal was to be
"wholly without prejudice to the counterclaims of Pat and Susan Sanchez." 0 The release made no mention of P-S Construction or Tafoya's
interest in the partnership."
Sanchez, on behalf of P-S Construction Company, counterclaimed
against FNB based on FNB's withholding of $125,243 from the total of
$400,000 specified in the loan. Sanchez sued under the theories of breach
of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and economic duress. Sanchez
sought to recover damages for the forced sale of the partnership and
personal assets, the financial ruin. of a once profitable partnership, at2
torney's fees, and damage to his personal credit and business rating.
The jury awarded Sanchez $1,503,000 in compensatory damages and
$125,243 in punitive damages. On a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict by FNB, the trial court reduced the compensatory
damage award by one-half. The court viewed the award as belonging to
the partnership and because Tafoya, an equal partner, had dismissed his

7. Id. at 319-21, 815 P.2d at 615-17. FNB demanded that the partners provide soil reports, a
copy of the partnership agreement, personal and corporate financial statements, and documents
from Farmers' Home Administration ["FmHA"]. FmHA planned to purchase the developed lots.
Id. at 321, 815 P.2d at 617.
8. Id. at 321, 815 P.2d at 617.
9. Id. at 319, 815 P.2d at 615.
10. Id. at 318 n.l, 815 P.2d at 614 n.l.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 322-23, 815 P.2d at 618-19.

COMMERCIAL

Spring 1993]

LA W

claim which represented a one-half interest in the judgment, the award
had to be reduced. 3 FNB appealed, 4 and Sanchez cross-appealed. 5
III.
In Sanchez, the
matters before the
lished the opinion
mootness, in both

MOOTNESS DOCTRINE

parties notified the court that they had settled all
court issued its opinion. Nonetheless, the court pub"for its precedential value alone.' ' 6 The doctrine of
New Mexico and other jurisdictions, makes it clear7

that a court's answering of a moot question is not precedent but dictum.

Ordinarily, the New Mexico Supreme Court's dicta would have strong
persuasive value, particularly as New Mexico case law on partnership
issues is not well developed. The partnership discussion in Sanchez should,
however, be accorded no persuasive value, as will be discussed in the
next section.
A.

Mootness Doctrine in New Mexico
The New Mexico Supreme Court's long-recognized practice of not
adjudicating "purely academic causes"'" is driven by its policy of conserving judicial resources.19 "[An] orderly and uniform procedure is necessary to enable the courts to dispatch business, and secure an end to
litigation." ' 20 If the court answers a moot question, "the successful party
in the lower court would never know when he was secure in the relief

awarded him.'

'21

Unlike the Federal Constitution, New Mexico's Constitution does not
contain a "cases or controversy" provision." The New Mexico Supreme

13. Id. at 318-19, 815 P.2d at 614-15.
14. FNB appealed the following issues: "(1) lack of substantial evidence on duress; (2) error in
the presentation of damages to the jury; (3) error in allowing a witness qualified as an expert in
banking law to testify that because the loan was not in fact an 'acquisition and development' loan
First National had 'no legal right' to withhold the $125,243; (4) the compensatory award was
excessive as a matter of law; and (5) lack of substantial evidence to support an award of punitive
damages." Id. at 319, 815 P.2d at 615.
15. Id. at 318, 815 P.2d at 614. Sanchez argued that the trial court erred in reducing the
compensatory damage award by 1/. Id.
16. Id. at 326, 815 P.2d at 622.
17. The Utah Supreme Court has reasoned that when a case becomes moot after an appeal has
been filed from a lower court decision, the appellate court should vacate the decision of the lower
court and remand the case with'instructions to dismiss. Merhish v. H.A. Folsom & Assocs., 646
P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1982). Also, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held: "Deliberate disregard of
the necessary limitation on the scope of appellate review results in 'obiter dicta:' expressions which
go beyond the facts before the court and therefore are the individual views of the author of the
opinion and not binding in subsequent cases." Pike v. Gunyou, 488 N.W.2d 298, 310 (Minn. 1992).
18. Hatch v. Keehan, 61 N.M. 1, 3, 293 P.2d 314, 315 (1956).
19. Costilla Land & Development Co. v. Allen, 17 N.M. 343, 346, 128 P. 79, 81 (1912) ("If
the setting aside of [a lower court's judgement] would accomplish nothing, why should the court
be called upon to do an ineffectual thing?").
20.Id. at 347, 128 P. at 81.
21. Id.
22. The United States Constitution grants the judiciary power to decide "cases and controversies."
U.S. CoNsT. art. III.Among the Constitution's case or controversy requirements is that the claim
to be adjudicated not be moot. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); cf. N.M. CoNsT. art.
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Court, however, has held that "in order to confer jurisdiction on the

court' 2 to enter a declaratory judgement, an actual controversy must exist."
In addition, "[the New Mexico Supreme] Court has repeatedly
24

stated that it will not decide moot questions."
Despite the policy and law against adjudicating moot questions, 25 the
New Mexico Court of Appeals has, however, previously published an
opinion even after the parties had settled their controversy. In Riesenecker
v. Arkansas Best Freigh Systems,'26 the court published its opinion for
several reasons. First, the opinion was filed before the court learned that
the parties had settled months earlier. Additionally, the court decided
that New Mexico courts have the discretion to decide issues that are of
substantial public interest even though the dispute is moot. The Riesenecker court found that the operation of the workers' compensation laws
was an issue of substantial public interest. 27 Finally, the court published

its opinion in order to aid all attorneys in framing their arguments on
this issue in the future even though it had vacated its judgment. 28

VI, § 2. The state constitution states only that the New Mexico Supreme Court "shall exercise
appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law; provided that the aggrieved party shall have an
absolute right to one appeal." The phrase "provided by law" generally means "provided by statutes."
State v. Watson, 82 N.M. 769, 487 P.2d 197 (Ct. App. 1971). An "aggrieved party" is one whose
personal interests are adversely affected by an order of the court. State v. Castillo, 94 N.M. 352,
610 P.2d 756 (Ct. App. 1980).
23. Mowrer v. Rusk, 95 N.M. 48, 51, 618 P.2d 886, 889 (1980); see also State ex rel. Malony
v. Sierra, 82 N.M. 125, 136-37, 477 P.2d 301, 311-12 (1970) (Watson, J., dissenting). The court
discussed the necessary features of justiciability and stated that "opinions are denominated 'advisory'
when there is insufficient interest in the plaintiff or defendant to justify judicial determination,
where the judgment sought would not constitute specific relief to a litigant or affect legal relations .... " Id. The court concluded that advisory opinions are not permitted in New Mexico. Id.
The basis for the court's decision to require an actual controversy to decide an issue in a declaratory
judgment action may be found in the Declaratory Judgments Article. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 446-2 (1978).
24. Appleman v. Beach, 94 N.M. 237, 239, 608 P.2d 1119, 1121 (1980); see also New Mexico
Health & Social Servs. Dep't v. Chavez, 85 N.M. 447, 513 P.2d 184 (1973).
25. The judiciary may not ordinarily consider and determine moot questions. Mills v. Green,
159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895). "The duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide
actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon
moot questions .... " Id. "A 'moot question' is one that existed but because of [the occurrence]
of certain events has ceased to exist and no longer presents an actual controversy over interests or
rights of [a] party." IA C.J.S. Actions § 38 n.74 (1985). For example, a question becomes moot
where parties have settled their dispute. Local No. 8-6, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l
Union v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363 (1960). The strong judicial policies of conserving judicial resources
and of not creating unnecessary precedent also dictates that courts refrain from adjudicating moot
questions. Merhish v. H.A. Folsom & Assocs., 646 P.2d 731, 732 (Utah 1982); Dee-El Garage,
Inc. v. Korzen, 289 N.E.2d 431 (Ill. 1972); Marshall v. Whittaker Corp., Berwick Forge & Fabricating
Co., 610 F.2d 1141, 1147 (3rd Cir. 1979).
26. 110 N.M. 451, 796 P.2d 1147 (Ct. App. 1990).
27. Id. at 453, 796 P.2d at 1149. In determining whether substantial public interest exists, the
New Mexico Supreme Court has stated:
Among the criteria considered in determining the existence of the requisite degree
of public interest are the public or private nature of the question presented, the
desirability of an authoritative determination for future guidance of public officers,
and the likelihood of future recurrence of the question.
Mowrer, 95 N.M. at 51, 618 P.2d at 889.
28. Riesenecker, 110 N.M. at 453, 796 P.2d at 1149. The court had already issued copies to
the parties involved in this litigation and thus felt that it was only fair to allow all attorneys access
to the opinion. Id.
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Analysis of the Mootness Doctrine in Sanchez
In Sanchez, the New Mexico Supreme Court violated its own established
practice of not deciding moot questions .29 FNB and Sanchez settled all
matters, thus rendering the case moot.30 The parties no longer possessed
a sufficient degree of adversity3 and the harm complained of was no
32
longer immediate enough to justify the expenditure of judicial resources.
The extraordinary circumstances that occasionally provide an exception
to the mootness doctrine were clearly not present in Sanchez. Under the
test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Weinstein v.
Bradford,33 the parties in Sanchez are not in a situation capable of
repetition yet evading review. The dispute over a partner's authority to
bring or release a partnership claim is likely to last as long as the time
which a court requires to decide this issue. Moreover,
it is unlikely that
34
FNB or Sanchez would face this situation again.
B.

IV.

THE PARTNERSHIP ISSUES

In Sanchez both partners brought separate suits against FNB on behalf
of P-S Construction Company.35 FNB argued that one partner, Tafoya,
later released his partnership claim. The other partner, Sanchez, did not
release his partnership claim. Sanchez raised the issue of the validity of
partnership claims brought or released by fewer than all partners. This
section of the Note examines the shortcomings in the court's analysis of
the partnership issues and suggests an alternative approach to analyze
these issues.

29. See Appleman v. Beach, 94 N.M. 237, 239, 608 P.2d 1119, 1121 (1980); see also State ex
rel. Malony v. Sierra, 82 N.M. 125, 136-37, 477 P.2d 301, 311-12 (1970) (Watson, J., dissenting).
30. Sanchez, 112 N.M. at 326, 815 P.2d at 622. The court stated that it was only deciding the
issues of lack of substantial evidence on duress and error in the presentation of damages to the
jury, but went on to say that it would comment on the partnership issue "because it raised important
questions of partnership law .... " Id. at 319, 815 P.2d at 615. The court's discussion of the
partnership issue was, therefore, dicta addressing a moot question.
31. See Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. for Salt Lake County, 469 F. Supp. 424, 434-36 (D.
Utah 1979).
32. See Fire Fighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 595-96 (1984) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). The courts' duty is to ensure that it has sufficient concrete facts, and sufficiently
adverse parties to permit it to perform its proper role. Id.
33. 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975). A recognized exception to the mootness doctrine exists for cases
of public interest which involve disputes "capable of repetition yet evading review." Southern Pac.
Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). Two requirements are
inherent to this doctrine: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated
prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) a reasonable expectation exists that the same complaining
party would be subjected to the same action again. Weinstein, 423 U.S. at 149. Issues which fall
under this exception include the right to have an abortion, the right to social security benefits, and
welfare assistance. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973); Darby v. Schweiker, 555 F. Supp.
285, 289-90 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Fischer v. Weaver, 55 F.R.D. 454, 460 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
34. The refusal of the bank to disburse the remaining funds to the partnership caused the
dispute. The bank's decision stemmed from a change in personnel overseeing the partners' loan.
Sanchez, 112 N.M. at 321, 815 P.2d at 617.
35. Id. at 325-26, 815 P.2d at 621-22.
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The Court's Analysis of the PartnershipIssues in Sanchez
In Sanchez, the New Mexico Supreme Court found that the trial court
erred by reducing the partnership's damage award by one-half. 36 The
court reasoned that a partner could neither bring nor release a claim for
damages to partnership property or interest, nor bring or release a claim
for his proportionate share of a partnership claim unless he had the
consent of the other partners.17 The court questioned but did not decide
whether "under Section 54-1-9 of the Uniform Partnership Act there
could be implied actual authority or apparent authority for a partner to38
settle any part of a partnership claim that was not usual to the business."
claims
The court found that a partner could, however, bring and 3release
9
"based upon damage to personal property and interests."
In analyzing the facts of Sanchez, the court found that Tafoya's
counterclaim was not brought on behalf of the partnership nor did his
subsequent release of the counterclaim suggest that he was relinquishing
one-half of any partnership recovery. ° The court reached this conclusion
because neither FNB's complaint, the partners' answers, the stipulated
judgement, nor Tafoya's release mentioned P-S Construction Company
by name. 4 ' In upholding the validity of Sanchez's partnership claim,
however, the court reasoned that the parties at trial treated the counterclaim as having been made on behalf of the partnership even though
it did not mention P-S Construction Company. 42 The court concluded
that because Sanchez's partnership claim was unaffected by Tafoya's
the damage award by Tafoya's
release, the trial court erred in reducing
43
fractional interest in the partnership.
A.

Shortcomings in the Court's Analysis
The court's analysis of the partnership issues in Sanchez has several
shortcomings. First, the court did not examine the partners' claims to
determine which were personal claims and which were partnership claims.
The court also failed to discuss whether Tafoya had the power to bring
a partnership claim in the first place. 44 Instead, the court jumped to a
discussion of Tafoya's capacity to release a partnership claim.4 5 In doing
so, the court not only failed to analyze the issues logically, it also failed

B.

36. Id. at 326, 815 P.2d at 622.
37. Id. at 325-26, 815 P.2d at 621-22.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 326, 815 P.2d at 622.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 325-26, 815 P.2d at 621-22.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 326, 815 P.2d at 622.
44. The court discussed whether either Tafoya or Sanchez actually brought a claim on behalf
of the partnership but did not address the issue of whether either partner had the authority to do
so. Id. at 325-26, 815 P.2d at 621-22. The court stated that "a partner cannot bring suit as an
individual on a claim belonging to the partnership." Id. at 325, 815 P.2d at 621. This proposition
fails to recognize that an individual partner may have the authority to bring a partnership claim
under section 9 of the Uniform Partnership Act [hereinafter U.P.A.] and the laws of agency.
45. Sanchez, 112 N.M. at 325-26, 815 P.2d at 621-22.
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to recognize the uniqueness of the fact situation in Sanchez. The majority
of cases, including the cases relied on by the court, involve one partner's
capacity to bring a claim on behalf of a partnership or one partner's
capacity to release a partnership claim properly brought by all the partners.4
The facts in Sanchez are distinct in that both partners purported to have
brought their separate claims on behalf of the partnership and
subsequently
47
one partner attempted to release all partnership claims.
The court's discussion of a partner's capacity to release a partnership
claim was also flawed. In examining Tafoya's release, the court relied
on the captions of the documents existing when the release was executed
48
to determine whether he was releasing individual or partnership claims.
By ruling that Tafoya's release did not involve the partnership because
the captions to the complaint and release failed to mention P-S Construction, the court failed to consider the common name statute which
provides that the partnership need not be named in the caption as a
party to the suit in an action brought by or against a partnership.4 9
C. Alternative Approach to Analyze the PartnershipIssues Raised in
Sanchez
This section of the Note suggests an alternative, two-step approach to
analyze the partnership issues raised in Sanchez. The first step is to
determine the validity of the claim brought on behalf of the partnership.
This involves examining a partner's claim to determine whether it is
based on damage to personal property and interests, or on damage to
partnership property and interests. If the claim is based on damage to
personal property and interests, a partner has the capacity to bring and
release a claim. If, however, the claim is based on damage to the
partnership, one must examine the facts to determine whether the partner
had the capacity to bring the claim. If the partner did have the capacity
to bring the partnership claim, the next step is to determine whether the
partner had the capacity to release the partnership claim.
Both steps in the analysis involve the question of whether the partner
has the capacity to bind a partnership by his own acts. A partner's

46. Daniels Ins., Inc. v. Daon Corp., 106 N.M. 328, 331, 742 P.2d 540, 543 (Ct. App. 1987)
(partner in a limited partnership could not bring a claim on behalf of a partnership); Stephen v.
Phillips, 101 N.M. 790, 792, 689 P.2d 939, 941 (Ct. App. 1984) (one of three partners was the
proper plaintiff to bring a claim on behalf of the partnership because the second partner assigned
his interest to the plaintiff and the third partner no longer held an interest in the partnership); see
also I ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RiBSTEmN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHM § 1.03(c)(3)
(1988).
47. The bank asserted that Tafoya's counterclaim and subsequent release were made on behalf
of the partnership. Consequently, the trial court found that his release of the counterclaim was a
release of 50% of the partnership's claim. Sanchez, 112 N.M. at 318-19, 815 P.2d at 614-15.
Although Sanchez asserted that his suit was brought as an individual and not on behalf of the
partnership, some of the damages he sought clearly belonged to the partnership. Id.
48. Id. at 326, 815 P.2d at 622.
49. Id.; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-4-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1987). The statute provides that "suits
may be brought by or against a partnership as such, or against all or either of the individual
members thereof .... " Id.
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capacity to bind the firm is derived from two related sources: section 9
of New Mexico's Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"); and the doctrine
of authority, a concept of the law of agency. 50
1. Individual versus Partnership Claims
New Mexico case law makes it clear that, although an individual partner
may bring and release claims based upon damage to personal property
and interests, he generally cannot bring and release a claim based upon
damage to partnership property and interests.5 In Loucks v. Albuquerque
National Bank, 2 an individual partner brought an action against a bank
for wrongfully dishonoring partnership checks and for damages resulting
from an ulcer the partner alleged was caused by the defendant's acts.53
The court found that "any damages arising from the dishonor [of the
partnership checks] belonged to the partnership" and thus this claim
could not be brought by the partner individually.5 4 The partner could,
however, bring a claim for his personal injuries."
2. The Uniform Partnership Act and the Laws of Agency
Section 9 of the UPA provides that a partner has complete authority
to bind the partnership in transactions with third parties by any act "for56
apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership.1
An individual partner's capacity to bring a partnership claim also stems

50. Another potential source by which a partner may bind the firm exists when the partnership
has dissolved. This type of authority is termed "winding up authority." See generally N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 54-1-29 to -37 (Repl. Pamp. 1988). Winding up authority grants a partner the power to
"bind the partnership .. .by any act appropriate for winding up partnership affairs or completing
Id. § 54-1-35. This potential source of authority will
I...
transactions unfinished at dissolution .
not be discussed further as P-S Construction was not dissolved at the time of this dispute.
51. 76 N.M. 735, 747-48, 418 P.2d 191, 199-200 (1966).
The rationale behind the common law rule prohibiting less than all partners from bringing a
partnership claim was to protect defendants from multiple suits, and to conserve judicial resources.
Smith v. Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 505 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Pine
Prods. Corp. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 11, 14 (1988); DeToro v. Dervan Inv. Ltd. Corp., 483
So. 2d 717, 721 (Fla. 1986). From the view point of the non-joining partner, the suit may be
viewed as a poor use of partnership resources if, for example, the claim is weak, the time and
money costs of enforcement may be high, or the chances of collecting a judgment may be small.
See Cates v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1179 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988). Moreover, the partners may not agree on the plaintiff partner's choice
of counsel or method of handling the case. Id. at 1179. The suit may even lead to counterclaims
against the partnership for which all partners are personally liable. Id.
52. 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191.
53. Id. at 741, 418 P.2d at 195.
54. Id. at 744, 418 P.2d at 197.
55. Id. at 746, 418 P.2d at 199; see Amador v. Lara, 93 N.M. 571, 574, 603 P.2d 310, 313
(Ct. App. 1979). The right of a partner to recover for personal injuries and losses caused by a
defendant's tortious acts belongs to the individual partner and not to the partnership. Id. at 574,
603 P.2d at 313; see also Daniels Ins., Inc. v. Daon Corp., 106 N.M. 328, 742 P.2d 540 (Ct. App.
1987) (individual partner cannot bring suit on a claim belonging to the partnership).
56. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-1-9 (Repi. Pamp. 1988).
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from the law of agency.5 7 The UPA provides that the "law of agency
shall apply under this act." ' Section 54-1-9 of the UPA 9 and the laws
of agency provide the basis for one partner's liability for the acts of his
co-partners .60
In Dotson v. Grice,61 the doctrine of authority in agency law was
interpreted by the New Mexico Supreme Court as being a broader concept
than a partner's authority under section 9(A) of the UPA. In Dotson,
the court held that a partner's inherent authority to convey realty belonging
to the partnership without the consent of the other partners was sufficient

to bind the firm. 62 The court reasoned that whether or not section 9 of

the UPA embraces the doctrine of apparent authority, a partner can still
bind a firm under some6 other theory of an agent's authority, including
implied agent authority.
3. Application of Suggested Approach to Sanchez
In hypothetically applying the suggested approach to the facts in Sanchez, the first step is to determine whether Tafoya's and Sanchez's

counterclaims were for personal or partnership injuries. It is unclear from
the opinion whether Tafoya's counterclaim was for damages to him as
an individual or to the partnership because Tafoya was not a party to
this appeal. 64 Assuming that Tafoya's counterclaim was for personal
65

damages, he had the authority both to bring and release the claim. If
Tafoya's counterclaim was for personal damages then his subsequent
release of the claim would not have affected any partnership claims. 66
Assuming, however, that his counterclaim was based upon damage to
the partnership, Tafoya's capacity to bring the claim must be analyzed
under section 9 of the UPA and the laws of agency.
Sanchez's counterclaim, however, was based upon both personal and
partnership damages. 67 Sanchez clearly had the capacity to bring a claim

57. According to the laws of agency, a principal can be bound by an agent acting with actual,
apparent, or inherent authority. BROMEERO & RmsTEiN, supra note 46, § 4.01. Actual authority is
the power of the agent to bind the principal "by acts done in accordance with the principal's
manifestations of consent [to the agent]." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1988). Apparent
authority exists when the principal clothes the agent with the appearance of authority which could
reasonably lead a third party to believe that the agent had authority to act as he did. Id. § 8.
Implied (or inherent) authority arises from a third party's reasonable belief that the agent has
authority to do acts ordinarily entrusted to one occupying his position. Id. § 8A cmt. a-b.
58. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-1-4(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
59. Id. § 54-1-9.
60. 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 250 (1987).
61. 98 N.M. 207, 210, 647 P.2d 409, 412 (1982).
62. Id. at 211, 647 P.2d at 413.
63. Id.; see also National Hygienics, Inc. v. Southern Farm Bur. Life Ins. Co., 707 F.2d 183,
187 (5th Cir. 1983). A Mississippi court found that even if a partner acted outside the scope of
his actual authority as conferred by section 9 of the UPA, the partner may still have been acting
within his apparent authority. National Hygienics, 707 F.2d at 187.
64. Sanchez, 112 N.M. at 318, 815 P.2d at 614.
65. See Loucks, 76 N.M. at 746-47, 418 P.2d at 199-200.
66. See id.
67. Sanchez, 112 N.M. at 322-23, 815 P.2d at 618-19. Sanchez claimed the following elements
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for damage to his personal credit rating.6 His capacity to bring claims
for partnership damages, however, must be analyzed under the section
9 of the UPA and the law of agency. 69
a. Section 9 of the UPA
Assuming that Tafoya's and Sanchez's counterclaims were brought on
behalf of the partnership, the next step is to apply section 9(A) to the
facts of the case. Applying section 9(A) to Tafoya's counterclaim, the
issue becomes whether Tafoya's bringing of the claim on behalf of the
partnership was an act for "apparently carrying on in the usual way the
business ' 70 of P-S Construction Company. Businesses must settle out7
standing debts which are normally considered a usual business activity. '
P-S Construction Co., however, was in the business of developing real
estate and not litigating claims. The bringing of a lawsuit would not
comport with P-S Construction's "carrying on in the usual way of the
business.' '72 Tafoya, therefore, did not have the authority under section
9 of the UPA to bring a claim on behalf of P-S Construction Company.
As he did not have the authority to bring a partnership claim under
section 9, it is necessary to examine whether Tafoya had the authority,
under the section 9 of the UPA, to release a claim on behalf of P-S
Construction Company.
Section 9 of the UPA should also be applied in determining whether
Sanchez had the power to bring a claim on behalf of the partnership.
The Sanchez court did not discuss whether Sanchez had the authority
under section 9 of the UPA to bring a suit on behalf of P-S Construction
Company. Instead, the court found that since Sanchez and the bank
treated the claim as having been made on behalf of the partnership,
"any objection to Sanchez's lack of capacity to raise such a claim ...
was waived. ' 73 Applying section 9 to Sanchez's claim, however, makes

of damages: (1)loss of the partnership's 61 lots that were mortgaged to the bank; (2) loss of profit
on those same lots; (3) attorney fees in connection with enforcing the partnership's loan agreement
with the bank; (4) damage to Sanchez's personal and business credit; (5) loss of the partnership's
office building; and (6) loss of profit on another 44 lots Sanchez was forced to sell below market
value. Id.
68. See id.
69. Sanchez casts doubts on whether a partner acting with less than actual authority can bind
his firm under section 9 of New Mexico's UPA. The Sanchez court stated the following in dicta:
While a partner acting within his or her actual authority may execute a valid release
of a partnership claim, we question (but do not decide) whether under section 541-9 of the Uniform Partnership Act there could be implied actual authority or
apparent authority for a partner to settle any part of a partnership claim that was
not usual to the business.
Id. at 325-26, 815 P.2d at 621-22.
Two respected commentators disagree with the court's statement. See BRoasaRG & RmSEiN, supra
note 46, § 4.01. Bromberg and Ribstein argue that by virtue of the UPA's incorporation of agency
law, section 9 encompasses actual, apparent, and implied authority. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-14(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
70. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-1-9.
71. See BROMBERG & RmsTraN, supra note 46, § 4.02.

72. See N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§ 54-1-9.

73. Sanchez, 112 N.M. at 326, 815 P.2d at 622.
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it clear that his bringing of a legal claim on behalf of the partnership
was not "for apparently carrying on in the usual way" the business of
P-S Construction Company.7 4 Like Tafoya, Sanchez also lacked the authority under section 9 to bring a claim on behalf of P-S Construction
Company.
b. Actual Authority Under the Laws of Agency
Tafoya also lacked the authority to bring a claim on behalf of the
partnership under the laws of agency. Sanchez, however, may have had
implied authority to bring a claim on behalf of P-S Construction Company. The facts in Sanchez indicate that neither Tafoya or Sanchez had
express, actual authority to bring a partnership claim. If either Tafoya
or Sanchez had the other's consent to bring a claim on behalf of the
partners would not have brought claims on behalf of
partnership, both
75
the company.
c. Apparent Authority Under The Laws Of Agency
When analyzing the partners' capacity to bring a partnership claim
under the doctrine of apparent authority, it is unclear whether Tafoya
had the capacity to bring a claim on behalf of P-S Construction Company.
FNB knew that it was also dealing with Sanchez, an equal partner, and
that Sanchez would most likely have to approve of Tafoya's bringing
or releasing of this partnership claim because it was not an ordinary
business decision. The facts do not indicate, however, whether Sanchez
had consented to Tafoya's making such important partnership decisions
before, or whether FNB knew that Sanchez had allowed Tafoya to make
similar decisions in the past. It is possible that FNB was reasonable in
believing that Tafoya had the authority to act as he did because of past
experiences with the partners or knowledge of the partners' business
practices. Additional facts would be needed to make a more certain
conclusion about this issue.
Sanchez, however, may have had apparent authority to bring a claim
on behalf of the company. The bank seemed reasonable in believing that
Sanchez had the authority to act for the partnership, considering that76
Tafoya was no longer a functioning partner at the time of the dispute.
Sanchez, therefore, likely had the apparent authority to bring a claim
on behalf of P-S Construction Company.

74. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-1-9.
75. A situation where two individual partners each brought separate suits on behalf of the
partnership with the consent of the other partner would require a duplicate use of resources. Even
though the common name statute allows individual partners to bring suit on behalf of the partnership,
for both Sanchez and Tafoya to do so having consented to the other partner bringing suit would
be a poor business decision. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-4-5.
76. FNB knew that Tafoya was in a federal prison on cocaine charges before it accepted the
release of his counterclaim. See, e.g., Answer Brief for Cross-Appellee at 14, First Nat'l Bank in
Albuquerque v. Sanchez, 112 N.M. 317, 815 P.2d 613 (1991) (No.18236).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

d. Implied Authority Under the Laws of Agency
Under the doctrine of implied authority FNB would need to have
reasonably believed that Tafoya's and Sanchez's bringing and releasing
of a partnership claim against the bank were acts ordinarily entrusted
to each partner. 77 Bringing and releasing a partnership claim, the success
of which would determine the future of the partnership, were most likely
not acts ordinarily entrusted to each general partner of P-S Construction
Company. It would seem unreasonable for FNB to have believed that
Tafoya's position as an equal partner, without more, gave him the
authority to bring or release a partnership claim of this importance.
FNB, however, may have been reasonable in believing that because Tafoya
was an act
was in prison, Sanchez's bringing of a partnership claim
7
ordinarily entrusted to an equal partner in his situation. 1
The alternative approach suggested in this Note has several advantages
over the court's approach. First, it is in accordance with the majority
view on these issues. It is also clear, logical, and consistent. Lastly, the
suggested approach is flexible in that it can be adapted to varied factual
situations.
V.

CONCLUSION

As Sanchez does not fit into any exception to the mootness doctrine,
one must speculate as to why the court would publish this opinion. It
is possible that at the time the parties informed the court that they had
settled all matters, the opinion on all but the partnership issue, the last
issue, had been analyzed. The court may, therefore, have ordered that
the opinion be published because it was necessary to decide the other
issues raised in the case.
Regardless of Justice Ransom's purpose for publishing this opinion,
the court's own precedent leads one to the conclusion that the Sanchez
opinion is not precedent as Justice Ransom states, but merely dictum,
not binding on future litigants. Furthermore, the court's discussion of
the partnership issues should not be accorded persuasive value because
the analysis is confusing and inconsistent with the majority view on the
subject. The alternative approach suggested in this Note to analyze the
partnership issues in Sanchez is consistent with the majority view and
applicable to varied factual situations. The court's partnership analysis
should thus be re-examined and modified by both courts and practitioners
to reflect a better-reasoned and more consistent approach.
CHRISTINA ROBLES

77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A cmt. a-b.
78. It is unnecessary to examine Sanchez's capacity to release the partnership claim because the
facts do not require this analysis.

